Iran and Saudi Arabia pursue cautious rapprochement

Iran and Saudi Arabia are intent on continuing their cautious course of rapprochement. After a Saudi-Iranian deal brokered by China in 2023, the erstwhile rivals want to deepen their relationship.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s visit to the Saudi capital Riyadh at the beginning of October indicates that relations are developing. He also met Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia.
Rapprochement is a new approach for the two countries, whose relations have been considered particularly difficult since the Iranian revolution in 1979.
The tensions originated in a fundamentally different understanding of the political role of religion. After 1979, Iran’s approach to Islam was from the perspective of social revolution. For a long time, it positioned itself in the region as the leader of Shiite Muslims with rebellious tendencies.
For its part, the Saudi royal family, which is Sunni, relies primarily on the role of religion to maintain its power. It bases its claim to leadership in the region on Islam and its role as the custodian of the holy sites in Mecca and Medina.
The different positions became particularly apparent during the Arab Spring protests that began in 2010 and spread around the region. Saudi Arabia was concerned that Iran would shape and instrumentalize the protest movements.
Despite all the rhetoric about rapprochement, the two countries remain indirectly opposed to each other in Yemen, where the radical Shiite Houthi militia attempted to overthrow the government of Yemeni President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi and took control of large parts of the country. 
While Iran supported the Houthis, Saudi Arabia led a coalition of predominantly Sunni states, which was also supported by the West, predominantly the US, to fight them. One of the coalition’s motives was to push back against Iranian influence.
Nonetheless, Sebastian Sons from CARPO, a Bonn-based think tank, believes that the current rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia has several advantages from the latter’s perspective.
He told DW that after Iran attacked Saudi oil facilities in 2019, Riyadh realized that it could not completely rely on the US and would have to resolve issues with its Iranian neighbor. He added that in Riyadh, regional stability was considered a prerequisite for a successful economy, based on the one-sided dependence on oil.
“Riyadh also wants to put a definitive end to the conflict in Yemen, and in particular to the shelling of Saudi territory by the Houthis,” Sons said. “In this respect, it is hoping that Iran can have an influence on the militia.”
However, Hamidreza Azizi from the Berlin-based German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), said it remained to be seen what influence Iran has on the Houthis. He told DW that it was unlikely that Iran could dictate the Houthis’ every move. But he said that both Iran and the Houthis were looking out for each other’s interests, and that could contribute to an ongoing cease-fire in Yemen.
Azizi added that Iran was pursuing its concrete interests with its rapprochement with Saudi Arabia.
“Years of sanctions and economic mismanagement, corruption,” had hit Iran hard, he said. “The regime has been concerned about increasing economic challenges leading to probably more severe waves of protest,” adding that Iranians doubted the regime’s ability to govern effectively. 
He said that because Iran had not been able to reach an agreement with the West on the nuclear deal and “lift the economic sanctions,” it was “looking for other ways to compensate, for example trying to integrate into multilateral organizations like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, but also to improve relations with neighbors like Saudi Arabia.”
Iran is also concerned about its security interests, Azizi explained. Even before the rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which was brokered by China, “there were growing signs indicating that a normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel might be imminent. […] so Iran was really afraid of the potential of an anti-Iran coalition between Arab states and Israel, and the best way that they thought could help and prevent the formation of such coalition was to reach out to Arab states themselves.” He described this as “detente as deterrence.”
At the moment, Saudi Arabia’s normalization efforts with Israel before October 7, 2023 are no longer relevant, Azizi said, pointing out that Riyadh had spoken out in favor of a two-state solution for Israelis and Palestinians, which is currently not an option for Israel. 
But he insisted that Saudi Arabia had no intention of turning against Israel or giving the impression that it is turning away from the West by moving closer to Iran. Saudi Arabia wants strategic autonomy,he said.
For Sons, Saudi Arabia wants to be perceived as building bridges as a mediator with all players.
“Qatar performs a similar function,” he explained. “Saudi Arabia has traditionally been more reserved, but now seems to be positioning itself as a player that keeps the channels of communication with Tehran open.”
 “Messages from the Americans to the Iranians have already been communicated via the Saudis. This will be an important part of Saudi regional policy and diplomacy in future,” Sons said.
Azizi has a similar view. He thinks that improved Iranian-Saudi relations could contribute to the region’s long-term stability and that Tehran has understood that rapprochement is in the interests of all parties.
This article was translated from German.